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ABSTRACT
The public trust doctrine has a long history from its beginnings as an obligation on
states to hold lands submerged under navigable waters in trust for the public, to its
resurgence in the 1970s as a protector of natural resources, to its influence on state
statutory and constitutional law as the public embraced environmental protection
principles. However, many have argued that the public trust doctrine has not lived
up to its potential as a major player in environmental and natural resources law.
This article proposes a new framework for the public trust doctrine as a state tool
for environmental protection that relies heavily on state constitutional law and
environmental statutes to give additional content and power to this ancient common
law doctrine. By using this new theoretical framework based on recent judicial
trends, the statutory, constitutional, and common law manifestations of public trust
principles can all become mutually reinforcing rather than remain trapped in the
“either-or” dichotomy engrained in prior scholarship.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout its existence, the public trust doctrine has been pulled in different
directions and assigned different meanings. At its core, the public trust doctrine is
the idea that there are some resources, notably tidal and navigable waters and the
lands under them that are forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust
for the use and benefit of the public. To some, the doctrine is a vehicle for public
access to water, beaches, or fishing in a world otherwise dominated by private
ownership. To others it is a check on government attempts to give away or sell such
resources for short-term economic gain. To yet others, it is a back-door mechanism
for judicial taking of private property without just compensation through a clever
argument that the property was never “private” in the first place. In general,
however, it has been lauded as a doctrine full of potential for environmental and
natural resources protection, but also has been subject to significant criticism since
its resurgence in its modern form in the 1970s.
Criticisms of the modern public trust doctrine include that it is an anachronistic,
property-based doctrine that prevents a rethinking of how humans relate to the world
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from a holistic or ecological perspective;1 that it places emphasis on the judiciary
and the common law rather than more powerful and comprehensive legislative
efforts to protect the environment;2 or that it is a doctrine devoid of standards that
encourages judicial takings of private property without just compensation.3 As
William Rodgers stated in the 1980s, ten years after the modern doctrine burst on the
scene, “[i]t is a doctrine with both a radical potential and indifferent prospects.”4
Regardless of its alleged problems and limitations, this historic and amorphous
doctrine continues to be studied by students and scholars of property law,
constitutional law, environmental law, natural resources law and public lands law.
The purpose of this article is to create a new theoretical framework for a modern
public trust doctrine grounded in state common law that can be used broadly for
environmental protection purposes and is responsive to the various criticisms of the
doctrine set out above. Most scholarly treatment of the public trust doctrine has
explored the doctrine only in its common law form, or in its manifestation in state
constitutions, or in the statutory forms that exist in some states. By contrast, the
proposal set forth here refuses to look at the common law public trust doctrine
separate and apart from state constitutional and statutory provisions expressly
incorporating the doctrine, as well as the numerous and powerful state and federal
environmental and natural resources protection laws. This proposal draws on recent
developments in the state courts and attempts to develop a coherent framework states
can adopt to both recognize environmental rights and provide substantive standards
for applying the public trust doctrine today.
Under this new approach, there need not be a struggle between common law
public trust principles on the one hand or strong environmental statutes and
regulations on the other—it is not an “either-or” proposition. Instead, this
framework integrates public trust principles in all of its forms, allowing the common
law doctrine and legislatively enacted environmental protection provisions to be
mutually-reinforcing and, thus, more powerful. Moreover, by grounding the doctrine
1

See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust
Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44
VAND. L. REV. 1209 (1991) (arguing that public trust doctrine is a wrong or flawed solution to the
nation’s environmental crisis and has impaired the development of more ambitious reform movements).
2
See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986) (arguing that by being
based on a private property rights conception of natural resources law, the public trust doctrine is an
anachronism which impedes more progressive legislative developments to protect natural resources and
the environment).
3
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (arguing that public trust doctrine is an unworkable doctrine and
is incompatible with the values of a constitutional democracy); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial
Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990) (arguing that judicial changes in the law impacting private
property rights should not be immune from a takings analysis); George P. Smith II & Michael W.
Sweeney, The Public Trust Doctrine and Natural Law: Emanations Within a Penumbra, 33 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307 (2006) (arguing that expansion of the public trust doctrine to protect modern
environmental protection needs not grounded in natural law traditions would unreasonably interfere
with private property rights and result in improper judicial activism). See also Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (dissenting from denial of certiorari in
Oregon case denying development rights to owners of certain dry sand beaches because of public’s
interest in those beaches and arguing that “[n]o more by judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a
State transform private property into public property without compensation.”).
4
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in state law, rather than a confusing mix of state and federal common law, the
doctrine avoids the criticism that it is based on an outdated, pre-“Erie doctrine” view
of federal common law. Throughout this article I will make reference to “public
trust principles” to stand for this new and consolidated framework for natural
resources protection that courts can use to develop their own state public trust
doctrine.
A reorientation of the public trust doctrine is particularly timely now when, just
in the past few years, there have been new and significant shifts in ideas by the
government and the public regarding the scope of private property rights, the role of
government regulation, and the relationship between the state and federal
governments in protecting natural resources and the environment. In such times,
familiar methods of addressing longstanding issues of economic development,
private property, constitutional law, and resource conservation are being called into
question. Indeed, in recent years, the environmental regulatory state that has been
building since the 1970s often seems unable to even begin to address current issues
of global warming, energy needs, water pollution, and preservation of species and
open space. As a result, there has been a renewed focus on state law, including state
common law, and modern public trust principles should be part of that focus.
Part I provides a very brief history of the common law public trust doctrine with
a focus on its use and implementation after it was revitalized for environmental
protection purposes following Joseph Sax’s influential law review article on the
topic in 1970.5 This Part looks not only at the doctrine’s modern common law
scope, but how the doctrine has been integrated into many states’ constitutions and
statutory law beginning in the 1970s. Part II reviews recent case law that has made
efforts to integrate developments in the common law public trust doctrine, state and
federal statutes, and state constitutions in order to support decisions protecting
natural resources where any one of those legal doctrines on their own might be
insufficient. Part III explains the significance of these judicial developments in
today’s world and presents a framework grounded in state law to expand and
strengthen this holistic and mutually reinforcing public trust approach to protect and
preserve natural resources and the environment.
I.

HISTORIC ORIGINS AND MODERN CONCEPTIONS

The common law public trust doctrine is often described as elusive or vague as a
result of its ancient and diffuse origins and variations in scope among the states.6
Briefly though, the idea behind the public trust doctrine is that while private
ownership of land and resources dominates American property law, there are some
resources, notably navigable and tidal waters and the lands under them that are
forever subject to state ownership and protection in trust for the use and benefit of

5

See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
6
See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.20, at 155-56 (1986) (stating that the
public trust doctrine is “resoundingly vague, obscure in origin and uncertain of purpose” and that “its
theoretical underpinnings have not been adequately clarified.”); Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the
Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 355-56 (stating that the “general concept” of the public
trust has been “widely cited” in cases and scholarship, “the doctrine itself remained vague.”).
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the public.7 Although the origins of the doctrine may be in some dispute, most
scholars trace it back to Roman and English law, which held that property rights in
the rivers, seas and seashore were to be preserved for the benefit of the public for
navigation, fishing or other purposes. In other words, unlike other types of public
property, such lands could never be granted or sold into private ownership.8
As applied in the United States, the Supreme Court held in the 1840s that the
original colonies succeeded to the English crown the ownership of submerged lands
under tidal waters and that after independence, the newly formed state governments
held title to such lands.9 The Court also held that states later admitted to the Union
obtained the same ownership rights to submerged lands under tidal waters as the
original 13 states under the “equal footing” doctrine.10
With this significant ownership granted to states came limitations as well. First,
under the Commerce Clause, Congress had express authority to regulate those
navigable waterways subject to state ownership and exercise a “navigational
servitude” over such waters without paying compensation.11 Second, and more
significantly, the Supreme Court confirmed in 1892 in the significant case of Illinois
Central v. Illinois,12 that the historic public trust doctrine was an independent
limitation on the state’s power to sell or otherwise relinquish control over submerged
lands that instead must always be held “in trust” for the public.
Illinois Central involved state legislation in 1869 which granted to the Illinois
Central Railroad more than 1000 acres along the shores of Lake Michigan in the
Chicago Harbor, extending for a mile out from the coast and for a mile in length
across the city’s central business district.13 A few years later, the state had a change
of heart, revoked the earlier grant, and brought a lawsuit to have the original grant

7

RODGERS, supra note 4, § 2.16, at 171; Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 800
(2004);
8
See Sax, supra note 5, at 475-76; JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR
CITIZEN ACTION 163-65 (1970) (discussing origins of American public trust doctrine in Roman and
English law); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633-35. In Justinian’s compendium of Roman law, he declared
as part of natural law that there were communal rights in the air, running water, the sea and the shores
of the sea. See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 633 & n.10 (citing THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN bk. 2, tit. 1,
pts. 1-6 at 65 (J. Thomas trans. 1975)).
9
See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 367 (1842); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 828.
10
See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How) 212, 229 (1845) (holding that the statehood clause of the U.S.
Constitution, article 4, section 3, clause 1, required that new states enter the Union on grounds of full
political equality with the other states); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 828; Charles F. Wilkinson,
The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Scope and Source of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 443 (1989); Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 823-33 (discussing history
of state ownership of lands under tidal and navigable-in-fact waters).
11
See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 449-50 (citing United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co.,
229 U.S. 53 (1913) (denying compensation for lost power-generating value of hydro-electric site taken
under condemnation by Congress); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956);
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967)). See also Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897)
(although state holds title to navigable waters and lands underlying them, such title is subject to a
federal navigational servitude for the purpose of regulating and improving navigation); Glass v.
Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 64 at n.7 (Mich. 2005) (same).
12
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
13
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 433-44, 54; JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 170-71
(Alfred A. Knopf ed. 1971).
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declared invalid. The Supreme Court upheld the state’s claim on grounds that the
original grant of submerged lands was invalid under the public trust doctrine.14
The Court confirmed that the state held title to the submerged lands in Lake
Michigan,15 but also held that the title was “different in character” from other state
lands which could be sold into private ownership.16 Although the Court
acknowledged that it could not cite any authority where a grant like this had been
held invalid, it stated there were numerous decisions stating that that such property is
held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for the public. As a result, the
state’s control of such lands, for purposes of the trust, “can never be lost,” unless
conveyed for uses promoting the interest of the public.17 The Court went on to
recognize that the Chicago Harbor was of significant value to the people of Illinois,
and was to be held in trust for them so they could enjoy navigation, carry on
commerce and enjoy the liberty of fishing free from obstruction or interference by
private parties.18
The Court was not at all clear regarding the legal basis for this restriction on
state power and subsequent Court opinions have not provided additional clarity.19
Some scholars have proposed that the public trust doctrine is a product of
congressional preemption resulting from a comprehensive program to keep the major
watercourses free for navigation, or constitutionally founded in the commerce
clause.20 Others have argued it may be grounded in the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses.21 The Court in Illinois Central was also elusive as to whether
state law or federal law defined the scope of the trust and whether it was in any way
based on federal common law. Indeed, it was perhaps less crucial that the Court
define the precise basis for its holding because the case predated its 1938 decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, where the Court held that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”22 Illinois Central certainly implies that federal law governs
in the sense that that Illinois or any other state cannot override trust obligations by
statute.23 However, in 1988, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,24 the Supreme
Court held that each state could decide how broadly it wished to define its trust

14

Id., 146 U.S. at 454. For a detailed history of the fact of the Illinois Central case, see Kearney &
Merrill, supra note 7.
15
The Court held expressly that the submerged lands to which the state automatically held title were
not limited to tidelands but also include the Great Lakes and other major inland waterbodies. Illinois
Central, 146 U.S. at 435-37.
16
Id. at 452.
17
Id. at 453.
18
Id. at 452, 454.
19
See, e.g., Kearney & Merrill, supra note 7, at 803, 928 (referring to ambiguities in Illinois Central
opinion on source of the public trust doctrine in state or federal law).
20
See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 445-46. Wilkinson also raised the possibility that the doctrine could
be based either on federal common law or the guarantee clause of the U.S. Constitution, but rejected
those possibilities on grounds that it was unlikely a modern court would employ either basis to support
the doctrine. Id.
21
See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO. J. 411, 426-28 (1987).
22
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
23
See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453, 455 (broad references to “a State” and that “[a]ny grant of the
kind is necessarily revocable . . . .”); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 460.
24
484 U.S. 469 (1988).
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lands, even in the face of competing private property interests.25 Significantly, no
state court has attempted to do away entirely with the public trust doctrine within its
borders, the Supreme Court has never indicated that a state would have a right to do
so,26 and at least one state court has invalidated legislative attempts to do so.27 Thus,
one can consider the doctrine as containing a federal prohibition on any state efforts
to abrogate the doctrine entirely, but allowing states a wide berth to expand the
doctrine’s protection beyond a federal minimum.28
Putting aside its legal groundings, Illinois Central stands as an early invocation
of the public trust doctrine to prevent a state from placing public trust lands into
private hands for short-term economic gain to the detriment of the long-term
preservation of the resource for the public. As Joseph Sax detailed in his
groundbreaking 1970 law review article,29 courts in several states prior to 1970 had
relied on some version of public trust principles to prevent states from compromising
public trust resources in the name of economic development or to benefit private
interests.30 Based on this authority, Sax argued that the public trust doctrine as
implemented by the judiciary had the potential to become a powerful mechanism to
protect the public interest in access, navigation, and recreation against state action
that would attempt to privatize or limit those resources. In doing so, Sax
summarized the doctrine as applying where there was a legal right vested in the
public, the right was enforceable against the government, and the substance of the
right was harmonious with environmental concerns.31
More importantly, Sax argued that although the doctrine had historically been
limited to lands underlying navigable waters and situations involving state action
that would convey or destroy those lands, “the judicial techniques developed in
public trust cases need not be limited either to these few conventional interests or to
questions of disposition of public properties.”32 Instead, Sax posited that the mixture
of procedural and substantive protection applied in traditional public trust cases

25

Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 475-76, 482-83.
See Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 463-64.
27
See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) (holding as a matter
of state constitutional law that state cannot abrogate the public trust doctrine by statute); infra notes
166-69 and accompanying text (discussing case).
28
Id. at 464.
29
See Sax, supra note 5.
30
See Sax, supra note 5, at 491-546 (citing, e.g., Gould v. Greylock, 215 N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966)
(invalidating state lease and management agreement issued to private party to create commercial
development on 4,000 acres in public park); Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 227 N.E.2d 478
(Mass. 1967) (invalidating legislation authorizing filling of pond for highway construction); Robbins v.
Department of Public Works, 224 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969) (invalidating statute authorizing transfer of
wetlands “of considerable beauty” that were “often used for nature study and recreation” to public
works department for highway development); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land & Improvement Co., 67
N.W. 918 (1896) (invalidating legislation authorizing a private individual to drain a lake); In re
Trempeleau Drainage Dist., 131 N.W. 838 (1911) (invalidating state action taken to drain swamplands);
In re Crawford County Levee & Draining Dist. No. 1, 196 N.W. 874 (1924) (invalidating action to
drain wetlands)).
31
See Sax, supra note 5, at 491-531; Lazarus, supra note 2, at 642 (summarizing Sax’s views of the
doctrine).
32
Sax, supra note 5, at 556.
26
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would be equally applicable in cases involving air pollution, pesticides, strip mining,
utility rights of way, or wetland filling on private land that requires a permit.33
Sax’s article became a significant force that converged with other political and
social developments in the 1960s and early 1970s to establish the modern field of
environmental law and completely transform how the government and the public
responded to issues of natural resources, conservation, environmental protection and
economic development.34 Moreover, since 1970, court decisions have reflected a
growing awareness of environmental issues in developing the public trust doctrine as
a matter of common law, while state legislatures have acted in kind by adopting state
environmental protection provisions in their state constitutions and statutes often
based expressly on public trust principles. A brief review of this common law,
constitutional and statutory history follows. This review sets the stage for the
analysis in Parts II and III, which creates a framework to integrate the developments
in each of these areas.
A. Common Law Developments
Since Sax’s article in 1970, courts have decided hundreds of cases involving the
public trust doctrine and cited Sax’s article in many of them.35 These cases include
not only private parties suing the government for allegedly breaching public trust
duties (the most common situation in cases prior to 1970), but also private parties
suing other private parties and the government suing private parties.36 Not only have
the types of actions under the doctrine expanded but the reach of the doctrine itself
has expanded.
In certain states, court have expanded the doctrine from its historic domain of
ensuring public access to navigable waters to protecting use, access to, and

33

Id. at 557. Sax discussed many of these issues in more detail in his book Defending the Environment,
also published in 1970. See SAX, supra note 13.
34
See Rose, supra note 6, at 354 (placing Sax’s article in the context of the beginning of modern
environmentalism); Peter Manus, To the Candidate in Search of a Theme: Promote the Public Trust, 19
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 315, 331 (2000) (stating that Sax articulated his public trust thesis “at a moment in
history—perhaps the only moment in modern American history—when it appeared that the country’s
political and legal institutions might fully embrace environmental values.”); Delgado, supra note 1, at
1210 (stating that the time was “exactly right” for Sax’s article in light of the growing environmental
movement and efforts of scholars, activists and ordinary citizens calling “for greater attention to the
problems of decreasing quality of life, increasing pollution, and overdevelopment of the nation’s farm
and wilderness lands.”). See also ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1065-66, 1068 (3rd ed. 2005) (discussing impact of modern public trust doctrine on statutory protection
of endangered species, air quality, water quality, as well as all settings where human actors threaten to
destroy public trust resources, the state attempts to sell public trust resources, or governments attempt to
exploit public trust resources), Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax’s influence on federal
environmental statutes); Manus, supra note 34, at 331 (same).
35
See PLATER, supra note 34, at 1073 (stating that Sax’s article has been cited extensively and can
claim the majority of credit for the active presence of the public trust doctrine in U.S. environmental
law); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 644 (stating that between 1970 and 1985, in half of the states,
approximately 100 cases were reported involving the public trust doctrine, many of which cite Sax’s
article); Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 342 & n.125 (2005) (noting
that Sax’s article had been cited in at least thirty-three judicial opinions by 1989 and in six additional
opinions by 2005).
36
See Lazarus, supra note 2, at 645-46 (collecting cases).
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preservation of all waters usable for recreational purposes,37 the dry sand area of
beaches for public recreation purposes,38 parklands,39 wildlife and wildlife habitat
connected to navigable waters,40 drinking water resources,41 and inland wetlands.42
Courts have also used the doctrine to resolve water appropriation issues and have
held that even preexisting water rights may be curtailed if necessary to prevent
reduction of water in inland streams or lakes that provides aesthetic values or habitat
for animal and plant species or other natural resources.43
These more recent public trust decisions show how the environmental movement
of the 1970s began to influence state courts’ conceptions of the role of the common
law public trust doctrine in our modern world. Indeed, the supreme courts of
California, Wisconsin and Illinois and lower courts in other jurisdictions issued
strong public trust opinions in the 1970s that expressly recognized society’s growing
concern regarding environmental issues and the need for common law legal
doctrines to evolve to meet those needs.
For instance, in 1972 in Just v. Marinette County,44 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that a shoreland zoning ordinance prohibiting landowners from filling
wetlands abutting navigable waters was not a taking subject to compensation. In
reaching its decision, the court framed the issue as “a conflict between the public
interest in stopping the despoliation of natural resources, which our citizens until
recently have taken as inevitable and for granted, and an owner’s asserted right to
use his property as he wishes.”45 The court further stated that while swamps and
wetlands were once considered “wasteland, undesirable, and not picturesque,” as
people have become “more sophisticated” they now appreciate that swamps and
wetlands “serve a vital role in nature, are part of the balance of nature and are
essential to the purity of the water in our lakes and streams.”46 The court continued
37

See Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (extending
public trust doctrine to all waters capable of recreational use by the public).
38
See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 363-66 (N.J. 1984) (public trust
doctrine requires public access to dry sand beaches between high water mark and vegetation line in both
public or quasi-public ownership).
39
See Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm’n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970) (public trust applies to
parkland); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. New York 750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2001)
(common law public trust doctrine in New York extends to parkland and such land cannot be alienated
without express legislative authorization).
40
See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (holding trust purposes are broader than
traditional uses of navigation, commerce and fishing and include use as open space, for wildlife habitat,
scientific study and swimming); Pullen v. Ullmer, 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996) (doctrine applies to
salmon and other fish).
41
Mayor v. Passaic Valley Water Comm’n, 539 A.2d 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987) (public trust doctrine
applies to drinking water resources)
42
See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972); Lazarus, supra note 2, at 649-50. See
also RODGERS, supra note 4, at 172-73.
43
See, e.g., National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); Shokal v. Dunn, 707
P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985); CWC Fisheries v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988); United Plainsmen
Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm’n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); In re Water
Use Permit Applications, 83 P.3d 664 (Haw. 2004); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 465-66 (discussing
court decisions since 1970 extending the doctrine beyond its historic origins).
44
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
45
Just, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
46
Id. at 768.
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by stating that wetlands are a necessary part of “the ecological creation and now,
even to the uninitiated, possess their own beauty in nature.”47
The court concluded that the state’s “active public trust duty” respecting
navigable waters required the state to not only promote navigation but also preserve
and protect those waters for fishing, recreation, and scenic beauty.48 Because these
background trust principles were an inherent limitation on the landowner’s property
rights, the ordinance preventing the fill did not “improve the public condition” but
instead “preserves nature from the despoilage and harm resulting from the
unrestricted activities of humans.”49
A New York state court expressed a similar sentiment in 1972 in Smithtown v.
Poveromo,50 where the court provided a historical summary of the public trust
doctrine and stated that the entire ecological system supporting the waterways is an
integral part of those waterways and must be included within the purview of the
trust.51 The court continued by stressing the existence of new knowledge on the
useful functions wetlands perform such as acting as a buffer against potentially
dangerous waters, as a filtering system of the incoming tide, as a base for the marine
food chain, and as a nesting ground for birds and other endangered species.52
Likewise, in 1971, the California Supreme Court held in Marks v. Whitney,53 that
a private owner of tidelands did not have the right to fill the tidelands as a result of
the public trust doctrine. The court noted that the matter was of great importance
because of population pressures, demands for recreational property, and the
increasing development of seashore and waterfront property.54 The court stated that
although the public trust doctrine historically was defined in terms of navigation,
commerce and fisheries, the doctrine was “sufficiently flexible” to encompass
changing public needs.55 The court went on to note that there is a growing
recognition that one of the most important uses of tidelands is preservation of those
lands in their natural state, to serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and to provide environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life.56
Finally, in 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Scott v. Chicago Park
District,57 that a state senate bill conveying nearly 200 acres under Lake Michigan to
a steel company was void under the public trust doctrine. The court recognized that
the industrial plant to be built would create public benefits in the form of jobs and an
improved economy, but that the state could not satisfy its public trust doctrine
obligations through such economic benefits.58 As a counterweight to the economic
47

Id.
Id. at 768.
49
Id. at 771.
50
336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 359 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1973).
51
Smithtown, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 775.
52
Id.
53
491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
54
Marks, 491 P.2d at 378.
55
Id. at 380.
56
Id.
57
360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1977).
58
Scott, 360 N.E.2d at 781.
48
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public benefit, the court focused on the fact that Lake Michigan is a valuable natural
resource that belongs to the people of the state, and that “there has developed a
strong, though belated interest in conserving natural resources and in protecting and
improving our physical environment.”59
These cases from the 1970s show at least some state courts recognizing the
nation’s awakening to environmental issues and incorporating those principles into
public trust decisions in a major way. This phenomenon did not end with the 1970s.
In 1983, the California Supreme Court in the famous “Mono Lake” case held that the
public trust doctrine applied to inland, navigable lakes and required the state to take
into account ecological and aesthetic interests in making water allocation decisions
even where state statutes did not appear to allow consideration of such concerns.60
In reaching its holding, the court stated that Mono Lake was “a scenic and ecological
treasure of national significance, imperiled by continued diversion of water,” and
that the state’s public trust values require those concerns be integrated into the state’s
water appropriation scheme.61 The court’s decision detailed the lake’s steadily
increasing salinity which would impact the food chain, the adverse effects on
millions of local and migratory birds using the lake, and the lake’s value as an
aesthetic, recreational and scientific resource.62
In 1998, the New York Supreme Court held that a state law restricting
development in a natural area of Long Island was not an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation.63 The court began its discussion in a
manner nearly identical to the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s opinion in Just, by stating
that the case was “a clash between two dynamic impulses, the collective right to
preserve natural resources and the individual right of property.”64 In holding that the
public trust doctrine limited the plaintiff’s property rights so as to render the law not
a taking, the court provided a history of the public trust doctrine and argued that the
early common law in England and America spoke to the subject of environmental
regulation, and provided a common law custom that supported the law in question.65
In response to the plaintiffs’ contention that development would not result in
environmental harm, the court looked back all the way to Roman law for the
proposition that the “conservation of resources is intrinsically good and necessary for
the continuation of society.”66 Thus, the court concluded that in enacting
environmental laws, the government is simply meeting its requirement to preserve
resources for future generations.67
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Id. at 780.
Nat’l Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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Nat’l Audubon Society, 658 P.2d at 712.
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Id. at 715-16.
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W.J.F. Realty Corp. v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
64
W.J.F. Realty, 672 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
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Id. at 1009.
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Id. See also Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1045-47 (Ill. 1999) (Harrison J.,
dissenting) (arguing for citizen standing to challenge dam on a creek that would impact endangered
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In 2004, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly recognized environmental
protection values in finding that a diversion project that would impact private
interests in oyster beds was not a taking based in part on the common law public
trust doctrine.68 The court stated that the implementation of the project “fits
precisely within the public trust doctrine” because the public resource at issue “is our
very coastline, the loss of which is occurring at an alarming rate.”69 The court went
on to describe the threat to the resource as “not just environmental” but also the
health, safety, and welfare of the people as coastal erosion removes an important
barrier between large populations and hurricanes and storms.70 The court warned
that left unchecked this erosion would result in the loss of land, jobs and corridors
critical to businesses that rely on the coastal region for transportation.71 Thus the
court held that the interference with oyster beds must be allowed under the public
trust doctrine to address erosion concerns.72 The court’s concerns, of course, were
later born out by the massive disaster resulting from Hurricane Katrina in 2005.73
These cases provide only a few recent examples of state courts incorporating
environmental values into their discussions of the common law public doctrine as a
matter of state law, and using the doctrine to ensure that public trust resources are
protected and preserved. However, despite the fact that at least some courts have
been able to incorporate contemporary environmental values into the common law
public trust doctrine, the critics are correct that the common law doctrine on its own
remains limited. First, very few, if any courts, have extended the common law
doctrine beyond tidal or navigable waters, thus leaving unprotected inland resources
that are unconnected to navigable lakes or rivers.74
More important, relying exclusively on common law as the primary mechanism
to protect natural resources and the environment (whether in the form of the public
trust doctrine or in the form of more familiar doctrines such as nuisance or
negligence) has always had limitations which still exist today. As a general matter,
the common law tends to operate retrospectively rather than prospectively; it is
sporadic and case-specific; it develops slowly in multiple jurisdictions, making a
national and more immediate solution to a problem nearly impossible; it must abide
by common law burdens of proof and is administered by judges who often lack
specialized or scientific expertise in the area.75 These limitations of common law
generally are exacerbated in the public trust area where, unlike doctrines of nuisance
or negligence that exist in virtually every state jurisdiction, the public trust doctrine
68
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Id. at 1101-02.
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See, e.g., Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2006) (discussing
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is hardly recognized or used in many jurisdictions. For instance, the common law
doctrine has never been used for environmental protection purposes in Minnesota, a
state otherwise historically known for its progressive environmental protection
policies.76
As a result, the common law public trust doctrine is clearly nowhere near a
global solution to advancing protection for natural resources and the environment,
whether threatened by state action or private action. However, the public trust
doctrine can still play an important role in ensuring judicial review of actions that
threaten natural resources and the environment where an environmental statute does
not apply or is not being enforced, or where state constitutional provisions to protect
natural resources do not exist or are ineffective. In the cases described in this
Section, the public trust doctrine was often available as a last resort for judicial
review where there was simply no other statutory law, constitutional law or common
law available for relief. Thus, to the extent the common law public trust doctrine can
provide support to or be supported by environmental policies in state statutes or
constitutions, the doctrine will be in a position to play a more important role in state
environmental protection efforts.
B. State Constitutional Developments: Empty Rhetoric or Aspirational Guidance?
The environmental movement of the 1970s and Sax’s article led not only to a
resurgence in use of the common law public trust doctrine to protect natural
resources and the environment but also to efforts to amend state constitutions to
codify the public trust doctrine or create new constitutional rights to a clean or
healthful environment.77 Indeed, all state constitutions drafted since 1959 address
environmental and natural resources preservation issues, and several states with
constitutions enacted prior to that date have amended their constitutions to address
environmental issues, resulting in 42 states with constitutions that at least mention
environmental protection or natural resources.78 While some state constitutional
provisions do no more than authorize the legislature to enact environmental laws
(which it already has authority to do under its inherent police power), others codify
the common law public trust doctrine or set out a constitutional policy to protect the
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A Westlaw search of “public trust doctrine” in Minnesota gives a result of only one case applying the
doctrine in Minnesota, and in that case the court found that the doctrine applied only to navigable
waterways and did not extend to state parkland. See Larson v. Sando, 508 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. Ct.
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expansively the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 116B, which is based on public
trust principles.
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See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental
Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 247 (1999) (stating that
environmental quality amendments “first surfaced at the national level in the late 1960s and had they
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Earth Day.”).
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See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of
Montana’s Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 160 (2003).
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environment. Yet others grant rights to all citizens for a “clean and healthful
environment” or place mandatory duties on the state to protect the environment.79
Not surprisingly, the most powerful state constitutional provisions were enacted
in the 1970s at the height of the environmental movement.80 For instance, Article I,
Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, approved in 1971 states that:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of the
people.81
Similarly, Montana’s 1972 Constitution provides an “inalienable” right to a
“clean and healthful environment” and creates a duty upon both the state and private
persons to “maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for
present and future generations.”82 The same provision goes on to require that the
legislature provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty and provide
adequate remedies “for the protection of the environmental life support system from
degredation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and
degredation of natural resources.”83
Both the Pennsylvania and Montana constitutions thus not only codify certain
public trust principles regarding the state’s obligation to preserve natural resources
for present and future generations, but also go one step further and provide a right of
action for citizens or the state to enforce those rights.84 Moreover, unlike the
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PA. CONST. art I, § 27.
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Id. at art. IX, Sec. 1
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Other states which incorporate strong public trust and environmental protection provisions include
Alaska, Hawaii and Louisiana. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural
state, fish, wildlife and waters and reserved to the people for common use.”); HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1
(“For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve
and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and
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common law public trust doctrine which applies in most states only to navigable
waters and trust resources dependent on navigable waters (such as fish or migratory
birds), these state constitutional provisions extend protection to a much broader array
of resources and species.
While provisions like those in the Pennsylvania and Montana constitutions
would appear on their face to provide the solution to the limitations of the common
law public trust doctrine, appearances can be deceiving. For instance, the Montana
courts have interpreted the constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment
quite broadly to allow a range of actions based on the provision. In 1999, in
Montana Environmental Information Center (MEIC) v. Department of
Environmental Quality,85 the Montana Supreme Court held that the state’s right to a
clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right triggering strict scrutiny and
is not limited to health-based standards. In that case, the court held a nonprofit
group could sue the state environmental agency and a mining company to prevent
discharge of contaminants to a river that would adversely impact water quality and
species even though the agency’s rules allowed such a discharge.86
In reaching its decision, the court found that the amendment’s intention was not
to create a health-based standard but to permit no degredation from the present
environment and affirmatively require enhancement of that environment.87 The
court also implicitly found that the right to a clean and healthful environment was
“self-executing” meaning that it was not dependent on or limited to legislative action
or violation of regulatory standards.88 Two years later, in 2001, the Montana
Supreme Court recognized that the right to a clean and healthful environment
imposed requirements not only on state action, but also private action, when it held
that the provision required rescission of a private contract for a well installation that
would result in groundwater contamination.89
However, in contrast to the expansive interpretation Montana courts have given
their constitutional environmental provisions, courts in other states have not
generally followed suit. Illinois has a constitutional provision enacted in 1970 which
states that “the public policy of the state and the duty of each person is to provide
and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future
generations.”90 In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted this provision to
allow a private party standing to seek to enjoin construction of a dam on a creek that
allegedly would impact state endangered species. However, the court dismissed the
complaint on grounds that the constitutional provision was to protect public health,
aesthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible
and consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the people.”).
85
988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
86
MEIC, 988 P.2d at 1249.
87
Id. at 1247 (quoting from delegate statement at constitutional convention).
88
Id. The environmental provisions in the Illinois, Hawaii and New York constitutions are explicitly
self-executing. Courts have reached varying decisions on whether other state environmental provisions
are self-executing where the provision itself is silent. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 272
(Pa. 1976) (holding provision in Pennsylvania constitution is self-executing); Robb v. Shockoe Slip
Found., 324 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 1985) (holding environmental protection provision in Virginia
constitution is not self-executing); Klee, supra note 79, at 175-78 (discussing issue of self-execution in
various state constitutions).
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ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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which does not include protection of species.91 Although the decision was subject to
a strong dissent citing the growing knowledge of the interrelatedness between the
human condition and plant and animal species,92 the case means that the Illinois
constitution likely cannot be used in situations where the plaintiff cannot prove the
action or inaction will directly affect human health, as opposed to the environment
generally.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not given much teeth to the
aspirational language contained in Section 27 of its constitution quoted earlier in this
Section. Although Pennsylvania courts have held that Section 27 is self-executing,
they have also held expressly that in evaluating development projects, the
constitution does not require consideration of any environmental factors not already
required by statute.93 As a result, despite its broad language, Section 27 on its own
provides no substantive check on actions that may harm the environment.94
Even in those states with more directive environmental rights language, such as
Montana, state supreme courts in only four of the eight states with such language in
their constitutions have addressed the nature of these rights (Montana, Illinois,
Louisiana and Hawaii) and many other courts have found that their provisions are
not self-executing.95 As a result, there are very few cases where state courts have
held on the merits that a state constitutional provision provides singular authority to
prevent or require state or private action and most commentators have concluded that
the provisions are largely ineffective in most states.96 This ineffectiveness has been
attributed to various factors, including state court decisions holding that the
91
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provisions are not self-executing and the rise of federal and state environmental
statutes beginning in the 1970s which have provided easier vehicles to pursue
environmental rights than the general provisions in state constitutions.97
Commentators have also criticized the use of such constitutional provisions to drive
environmental policy, arguing that they should not be a substitute for the direct
legislative process,98 result in cluttered state constitutions,99 and inappropriately
inject complicated social policy issues into state constitutions where they do not
belong.100
Thus, lobbying for new and improved state constitutional provisions expanding
the scope of public trust resources or providing additional environmental rights is
likely not the best path toward creating an improved structure to protect natural
resources. One problem that is inherent in state environmental constitutional
provisions is that they by necessity contain broad, aspirational language usually
devoid of the specific standards necessary to implement concrete measures to protect
the environment in a complex world.101 Indeed, the critics are correct that the type of
clarity and detail needed to implement environmental policy is better suited to
legislative and administrative pronouncements (or even common law) and is not at
home in constitutional documents.
However this does not mean existing and future state constitutional provisions
expressing public trust principles or creating environmental rights need remain
merely aspirational statements devoid of any real legal significance. Instead, the
question remains whether these constitutional provisions can work together with
other more detailed environmental policy directives in legislation or developed in the
common law to protect public trust resources. Indeed, a vision of environmental
protection for future generations embedded in a state constitution may be just what it
takes to provide needed support for state implementation of a controversial
environmental protection program that adversely impacts private property rights. It
may also be just what it takes to cause a court to give additional scrutiny to state
action or inaction that may result in destruction of natural resources. Finally it may
be just what it takes to cause a court to strengthen its historic, common law public
trust doctrine and apply it to new situations not contemplated at the time of the
doctrine’s inception.
C. Statutory and Regulatory Developments: Standards, Direction and Precision
The most significant and tangible result of the environmental movement of the
1970s was not the development of the modern public trust doctrine or the adoption of
state constitutional provisions on the environment but the creation of comprehensive
federal environmental statutes and the agencies to implement them through
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regulation and enforcement.102 These developments at the federal level led to a
similar explosion of laws, regulations and agencies at the state level, as the states
began to implement federal mandates through the concept of “cooperative
federalism.”103 These new federal and state statutes in the 1970s and 1980s thus set
legislative policy and enforcement mechanisms on a national and state level in areas
of air pollution, water pollution, pesticides, toxic substances, soil and groundwater
contamination and remediation techniques.104 These federal and state environmental
protection statutes form the basis of the environmental regulatory state that exists
today. Many of these statutes, particularly the National Environmental Policy Act,105
the Clean Water Act,106 and the Endangered Species Act,107 are based on public trust
principles in the sense that they set out a policy of protecting and preserving the
environment for its own sake and for future generations.108
In addition to these federal and state environmental protection statutes, however,
there also exist a different type of environmental statute based expressly on public
trust principles, described here as state “environmental rights” statutes. Once again,
Sax is responsible for this development and his vision for incorporating public trust
principles into statutory law now becomes the third of three public trust forms
discussed in this Article.
In the same year as his famous article on the public trust doctrine, 1970, Sax also
published a book titled Defending the Environment, in which he set out in more
detail the potential for the public trust doctrine as well as other mechanisms for
judicial review of actions that may harm the environment.109 He ended the book
with a discussion of a “model law” that, at the book’s publication, had just come into
existence in the state of Michigan. Sax assisted in drafting this law, known as the
Michigan Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”),110 which Sax stated had three
purposes. He described these purposes as recognizing the public right to a decent
102
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1970-1980 as containing an “explosion” of federal legislation and creating an era of “federal regulatory
infrastructure.”); id. at 88-89 (providing chronology of significant federal environmental legislation
between 1970 and 1980 including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Amendments
of 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), the 1972 Federal Environmental
Pesticide Control Act, the Endangered Species Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic
Substantives Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act); Ruhl, supra note 77, at 247 (“By the mid1970s, however, the command-and-control regime of federal environmental protection legislation had
evolved with unprecedented speed into a juggernaut of the administrative state.”).
103
See PERCIVAL, supra note 102, at 101 (stating that the predominant approach to federal-state
relations under the environmental statutes today is “cooperative federalism” where federal agencies
establish national environmental standards and states may opt to assume responsibility for
administering them).
104
See, e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 102, at 88-95 (describing federal environmental laws setting policy
directives and comprehensive regulatory framework); Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 626-30 (2001) (describing increased
expertise and competence in environmental area at state level).
105
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347.
106
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
107
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
108
See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 1213 (recognizing Sax’s influence on federal environmental
statutes); Manus, supra note 34, at 331 (same).
109
See SAX, supra note 13 at 149-92.
110
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.1701-.1706.

18

MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES

environment as an enforceable legal right; making it enforceable by private citizens
suing as members of the public; and setting the stage for the development of a
common law of environmental quality.111 As to the third consideration, Sax stated
that the bill purposefully did not define pollution, environmental quality or the public
trust in order to allow the courts to develop a common law approach to
environmental problems. In this way courts have ability to address problems as they
are identified and formulate a flexible solution for the occasion.112
These state statutes providing for citizen standing to protect the environment and
more aggressive judicial review of state and private action have, just like state
constitutional environmental provisions, met with mixed results. For instance, the
Minnesota legislature enacted the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (“MERA”)
in 1971 and substantially modeled it after Michigan’s law. MERA gives any natural
person, corporation, state agency or municipality the right to bring a civil action in
district court for declaratory or equitable relief against any person “for the protection
of the air, water, land or other natural resources” within the state, whether publicly or
privately owned, “from pollution, impairment or destruction.”113
“Natural
resources” include, but are not limited to “all mineral, botanical, air, water, land,
timber, soil, quietude, recreational and historical resources” as well as scenic and
esthetic resources when owned by the government.114 A plaintiff can establish
“pollution, impairment or destruction” of natural resources either by showing the
conduct at issue will violate an environmental standard or permit or by showing that
the conduct at issue “materially adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely
affect the environment.”115
Minnesota courts have interpreted MERA very expansively, broadly granting
citizens standing to challenge state, local and private actions, and concluding that the
“natural resources” protected under the law include birds and the trees they nest
in,116 historic buildings,117 marsh and wildlife areas,118 the view from a state forest
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and the wilderness experience in visiting the forest,119 quietude in residential areas,120
drinking water wells and wetlands.121 Actions that have been enjoined under the law
include a gravel pit,122 a shooting range,123 tree harvesting,124 a private radio tower on
private land125 and condemnations for highway and jail projects.126
The law’s most significant impact on protection of natural resources and the
environment can be seen in the automatic standing given to all persons and the fact
that the law can protect natural resources where existing state statutory or regulatory
law is silent or state regulators decline to take action.127 For instance, in a case
involving a shooting range that was disturbing residential neighbors, the court found
a MERA violation for impairment of “quietude” and enjoined the range’s operation
despite the fact that there were no local or state noise standards in place. Indeed,
state statutory law prohibited state agencies from even enacting such standards.128
By contrast, Michigan courts have been less generous on standing issues in
interpreting the Michigan Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”)129 than have
Minnesota courts in interpreting the Minnesota law. As noted above, Michigan
enacted MEPA as the first environmental rights statute in 1970 after Sax worked
with state citizen organizations and the state legislature to help draft the law. MEPA
subsequently served as model for other states.130 Like the Minnesota law, Michigan
courts have interpreted MEPA to provide for declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent harm to natural resources even where the action at issue does not violate a
statute or regulation. As a result, MEPA empowers the judiciary to create a common
law of environmental quality that goes beyond existing state statutes or regulatory
118
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requirements in a manner similar to that developed under the common law of
nuisance or other torts.131
Also similar to the Minnesota law, courts have interpreted the scope of the
Michigan law quite broadly to apply to toxic substances control, sand dune mining,
wetlands protection, park management and leasing of Great Lakes bottomlands.132
As in Minnesota, the Michigan legislature created broad coverage for the law,
allowing for action to protect “the air, water, and other natural resources and the
public trust in those resources from pollution, impairment or destruction.”133 Thus,
as Sax envisioned, the law gives the judicial branch the authority as a matter of
common law to prevent the impairment of natural resources where the government
cannot or will not act pursuant to state or local legislative policy.134
However, Michigan courts have been fairly restrictive on the issue of citizen
standing to enforce the law. Like the Minnesota law, MEPA contains a broad citizen
suit provision which states that “any person may maintain an action . . . for the
protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust in these
resources from pollution, impairment or destruction.”135 However, in a 2006
decision, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a water conservation organization
and plaintiffs residing along a stream and lake could not sue under MEPA to prevent
a water bottling company from pumping water that would allegedly adversely impact
the lake and wetlands.136 In reaching this decision, the court held that MEPA could
not confer standing on citizens that was any broader than allowed under the state
constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.137 As result, in order to bring suit under
MEPA, the plaintiffs needed to show that they used the areas in question and thus,
with regard to certain of the areas at issue in the lawsuit, the plaintiffs lacked
standing under MEPA.138
In all, by the late 1990s only fifteen states had environmental rights statutes on
the books (as opposed to citizen suit provisions contained in state environmental
laws for the purpose of enforcing those laws), and most state environmental rights
statutes are much more limited than those in Minnesota and Michigan, allowing only
for actions against the state, or only for actions to enforce violations of existing
131
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law.139 In addition, environmental rights lawsuits are expensive and the few statutes
that allow recovery of attorneys fees are within the category of laws that provide for
a right of action only for violation of existing law.140 Indeed, the strength of such
laws is that the court conducts a de novo review of evidence rather than an on-therecord review with great deference to the government agency making the decision.
However, it is just this type of de novo review that requires discovery and expert
testimony which is too expensive for most plaintiffs to contemplate.141 Thus, just as
was concluded earlier with regard to the common law public trust doctrine and state
constitutional provisions, state environmental rights statutes on their own are not a
complete solution to better preservation of natural resources where federal, state or
local protection efforts break down.
The same is true to a lesser extent with federal and state environmental
protection statutes. Although such laws and the enforcement mechanisms that go
with them form the bulk of our environmental protection efforts today, even these
powerful statutes have their limitations. For instance, some statutes do not allow
private parties to obtain injunctive relief or damages, others do not allow private
rights of action at all, and there can also be significant delays in statutory authority to
address controversial problems such today’s concerns over as greenhouse gas
emissions.142
As a whole, however, federal and state environmental protection laws coupled
with state environmental rights statutes where they exist serve an important role not
139
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only in their own right but also in setting forth legislative policy on protection of
natural resources, public trust principles and the environment for use in common law
or constitutional development. In the majority of cases where such resources are
threatened, federal, state, and/or local enforcement agencies will use federal and state
environmental protection laws to address the problem. However, as Sax and many
others have documented, government regulation and enforcement can break down
because of lack of political will, time, money or other resources, or competing legal
concerns such as constitutional takings arguments. The question then remains in
those situations whether the policy directives in these laws can be used in
conjunction with the common law public trust doctrine and/or state constitutional
provisions. In other words, can these seemingly discrete sources of law work
together to either support state or local action to protect the environment when there
are competing private property principles, or allow citizen protection of resources in
the face of governmental indifference or opposition? The next Section explores
recent judicial efforts to adopt such a mutually-reinforcing approach to state natural
resource protection using public trust principles.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL TRENDS: EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES

Most of the scholarly work to date on the public trust doctrine focuses almost
exclusively on either the common law doctrine or its state constitutional
manifestations or its codification into state statutes. Although a study of one form of
the doctrine on those topics may often make a brief reference to one of the other
forms, there has not been any real effort to consider what the public trust might look
like as a cohesive whole where all three forms mutually reinforce each other.143 A
review of the case law shows, however, that while scholars have largely ignored this
approach, courts have not. Just like lawyers, judges must frequently look beyond the
direct authority available to support a legal principle to related authority in order to
build a strong legal basis for a position. It is precisely this type crafting of legal
opinions that gives the judicial branch its unique and important role in our federalist
system of law built on constitutions, statutes and the common law.144
Notably, the judicial opinions that utilize this mutually reinforcing approach to
public trust principles for environmental protection purposes have been issued
primarily in the last ten years. One explanation for this recent trend is that the field
of environmental law is now, after 30 years, reaching maturity and there is a strong
body of state constitutional law and, more importantly, federal and state
143

One exception is Kirsch, supra note 79, where the author focused on environmental provisions in
state constitutions but also discussed in some detail the relationship between those provisions and the
common law public trust doctrine to argue that courts were able to give the most meaning to the state
constitutional provisions when they were interpreted as “evocations” of the public trust doctrine. Id. at
1174.
144
See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37-37 (Little Brown & Co. ed. 1938)
(1881) (urging courts to create a “more conscious recognition” of legislation in developing the common
law); ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 174-75 (Hamilton & Jaren eds. 1999) (focusing
on the necessity of the common law despite the growth of statutes and stating that the role of the courts
is not just to interpret statutes but to “incorporate” legislation into the growing body of common law
tradition); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (1936)
(stating that judges should recognize the “social policy and judgment expressed in legislation” in
forming the common law).

MODERN PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES

23

environmental statutes that courts can rely on not only in implementing those
constitutional provisions and statutes, but also in developing public trust principles.
Moreover, as the modern common law public trust doctrine has developed since the
1970s, courts can now rely on that body of law to inform their interpretations of state
constitutional law and statutory law.
This shift in judicial treatment of public trust principles to broaden the range of
authority is an exciting development that addresses many of the concerns of the
critics and, as discussed below, can bring the doctrine to a new level of relevance
today. This is particularly important in states that historically have not had a strong
public trust doctrine or do not have constitutional provisions or statutes codifying the
doctrine in some manner. Because Illinois Central appears to impose the public trust
doctrine nationwide (i.e., states can interpret it narrowly but not abolish it),145 states
or citizens in those states can use the public trust doctrine where appropriate and rely
on general state or federal environmental statutes to provide standards for
development.
Certainly, one might argue that the Erie doctrine146 implicitly overruled Illinois
Central’s efforts to mandate the public trust doctrine nationwide because the Court
did not expressly ground the doctrine in any particular constitutional provision or
federal statute. However, in its most recent consideration of the public trust doctrine
in 1988,147 the Court did not question the vitality of the doctrine, simply stating that
the scope of the doctrine was a matter of state law.148 Moreover, even if the doctrine
is now wholly a matter of state law, no state has taken steps to abolish it and at least
one state court has invalidated legislative efforts to abolish it.149 Indeed, all of the
precedent supporting an expansion of the public trust doctrine consistent with the
framework set forth here is found in state law, not federal law. As a result, even if
states could refuse to recognize the doctrine entirely, that theoretical possibility does
not detract from present opportunities to give new life to the doctrine as a matter of
state law in those states that have the tools (i.e., state constitutions, statutes and
policy directives) and are inclined to move in that direction.
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The recent cases that provide examples of this new public trust framework tend
to fall into two general categories. The first category is where courts rely on a
combination of the public trust doctrine, state constitutional provisions, or state
environmental statutes to invalidate state action (whether administrative or
legislative) that may place state public resources in jeopardy. The second category is
where courts rely on a combination of the public trust doctrine, state constitutional
provisions, and state environmental statutes to uphold governmental actions that
prevent development of private property without finding such government action
constitutes a taking. These cases usually involve governmental entities refusing to
grant a development permit or enacting a regulation to protect natural resources on
the grounds that the private property in question is subject to and thus inherently
limited by public trust principles.
The decisions in both categories of cases show the courts looking at the idea of
the public trust and the preservation of resources broadly, and using various strands
of authority to create support for protection of such resources. Notably, these
decisions are primarily in jurisdictions that do not have a history of recognizing a
“strong” common law public trust doctrine (such as exists in California, New Jersey,
or Wisconsin), and thus shows how the common law public trust doctrine can be
used in conjunction with other authority when common law authority on its own may
be lacking.
A. Judicial Use of Public Trust Principles to Prevent State Action
The cases that follow are all recent examples of courts invoking a combination
of authority related to protection of natural resources and the environment in
situations where the state is alleged to be relinquishing or compromising the
resources or the public’s interest in those resources. In all these cases, courts look to
some combination of common law, state constitutional law and/or statutory
environmental law to invalidate the state action.
For instance, in 2004, the Hawaii Supreme Court considered whether a
reservation of water for instream use was protected by the public trust, and whether
the state water commission sufficiently considered public trust principles in granting
a water permit.150 The court held that the commission failed to take those principles
into account, expressly holding that “a reservation of water constitutes a public trust
purpose with respect to the state’s continuing trust obligation” to ensure water
resources for present and future generations.151 In reaching this decision, the court
looked to the common law public trust doctrine, the state constitution, and the
statutory water code as support for its decision. The court held that failure to protect
such water reservations “would undermine the public trust doctrine, which is a state
constitutional doctrine, and the relevant policy declarations set forth in the Code.”152
Thus, the court broadened its base of authority with regard to natural resources
within the state in order to provide the maximum protection for such resources.
Similarly, in Save Ourselves v. Louisiana Environmental Control
Commission,153 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a state agency decision
150
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allowing construction and operation of a hazardous waste disposal facility was
contrary to state statutory law, constitutional law and the public trust doctrine. In
reaching this decision, the court expressly addressed the “interrelationship of
constitutional, statutory and regulatory requirements” beginning with the state
constitution’s environmental provision enacted in 1974, placing obligations on state
agencies and officials.154 The court then went on to consider various state
environmental statutes setting forth a policy of environmental protection. These
policies set out not only substantive requirements but “very important procedural
provisions” designed to ensure agencies exercise appropriate discretion in all
cases.155 The court concluded this discussion by stating that the state regulatory
framework was based not only on the state constitutional provisions related to
environmental protection, but also the “public trust doctrine,” and referred to Sax’s
article and other commentators setting forth an expansive vision of the doctrine.156
Likewise, in 1996, in Pullen v. Ulmer,157 the Alaska Supreme Court addressed
whether a ballot initiative to give salmon harvest preference to subsistence, personal
use and sport fisheries was valid. The court held that the initiative was an
unconstitutional appropriation of state resources.158 First, the court looked to Article
VIII, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution which reserves fish, wildlife and waters to
the people for common use.159 The court then turned to the common law, noting that
the relevant constitutional provision was intended to codify “historic common law
principles” over management of fish, wildlife, water resources, and impose a trust on
those resources.160 Interestingly, this case highlights the conflict that can occur
between the public trust doctrine as a protector of public access rights and the public
trust doctrine as a protector of the resource. Arguably, the court’s decision limited
the state’s ability to preserve fishing resources from overuse, thus favoring the
doctrine’s traditional purpose of preserving public access to resources over its more
modern purpose of preserving the resource itself.
Finally, two cases from Arizona illustrate the state judiciary relying on the public
trust doctrine to prevent the state legislature from interfering with public trust
resources. In the first case, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v.
Hassell,161 the Arizona Court of Appeals addressed whether legislation substantially
relinquishing the state’s interests in riverbed lands violated the public trust doctrine.
The court cited first to Illinois Central in support of the doctrine, then to various
statutory and constitutional provisions in other states for the proposition that states
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are required to hold such lands in trust for the public.162 The court then looked to
Arizona precedent, recognized that the doctrine had not yet been applied in Arizona,
but stated that in order to resolve the case “we need not weave a jurisprudence out of
air.”163 The court relied not only on Illinois Central, Sax’s article, and authority
from other states, but also the state’s “constitutional commitment to the checks and
balances of a government of divided powers.”164 Thus, the court stated it would
scrutinize closely any state action that might violate the public trust doctrine and,
applying such scrutiny, found the legislation violated the state’s public trust
principles.165 Here, the court had very little in the way of state common law
authority to rely upon, but reached a decision based on its own constitutional
separation of powers principles as well as statutory, constitutional and common law
precedent in other jurisdictions.
In the second Arizona case, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court,166 the
Arizona Supreme Court in 1999 reviewed a state statute enacted in 1995 which
stated that “[t]he public trust is not an element of a water right” and that in
adjudicating water rights, “the court shall not make a determination as to whether
public trust values are associated with any or all of the river system or source.”167
The supreme court invalidated the provision, stating that the public trust doctrine in
Arizona is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources in
trust for the public.168 The court went on to state that it was “for the courts to decide
whether the public trust is applicable to the facts” and that the legislature cannot by
statute destroy the constitutional limitations on its authority.169
These cases all show courts utilizing common law, state constitutional law, and
state statutes to support a critical review of state action that has the potential to
interfere with public trust principles. As such, the analysis contained in these cases
is quite different from that found in the opinions issued in the 1970s, such as Just v.
Marinette County170 and Marks v. Whitney.171 In those cases, the courts had little to
draw upon at a doctrinal level other than a vague idea of public trust principles and
belief that the courts can and should play a role in natural resources protection.
By contrast, a review of the more recent cases shows that courts have more to
work with since the environmental movement of the 1970s, which brought with it
state constitutional provisions and statutes containing strong policy statements with
regard to protection of natural resources for future generations. As a result, these
increased statements of authority and policy statements provide substantive content
to public trust principles and at least a partial response to those who would criticize
close judicial review of legislative action. Indeed, Sax himself acknowledged that
“public trust law is not so much a substantive set of standards” as it is a technique for
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courts to mend “perceived imperfections” in the legislative and administrative
process.172
The need for the increased authority courts are amassing from various sources is
just as great in cases where the state is attempting to protect natural resources in the
face of private property claims. As shown below, courts in this second category of
cases use techniques similar to the cases in the first category, resulting in a stronger
and more comprehensive legal foundation to protect natural resources and the
environment.
B. Judicial Use of Public Trust Principles to Defend State or Local Governmental
Action
The cases that follow show courts invoking a combination of authority related to
protection of natural resources and the environment to support state actions to protect
those resources in the face of competing private property claims. In doing so, courts
are utilizing public trust principles to address modern problems without being
limited by the various forms in which these principles are found. Thus, courts are
relying on the common law doctrine but infusing it with policies and standards
contained in more contemporary environmental legislation or state constitutional
provisions. As shown below, courts have used these mutually-reinforcing methods
to reject attempts to invalidate government environmental protection efforts and also
to reject takings claims.
1. Public trust principles in support of government action
In several recent cases, courts have drawn upon multiple sources of public trust
principles to support governmental efforts to protect natural resources or the
environment. For instance, in 2005, the Louisiana Court of Appeals relied on the
Save Ourselves173 decision discussed above to hold that a state agency decision to
lower lake levels to reduce organic matter and improve the lake’s ecology was
supported by the public trust doctrine.174 In response to allegations that the proposed
action would interfere with property rights by adversely impacting commercial
marinas, the court found that the state’s action was consistent with the public trust
doctrine and its manifestation in the state’s constitution.175 The court recognized that
“[e]nvironmental amenities will often be in conflict with economic and social
considerations,” but that under the public trust doctrine, the agency has an obligation
to protect the state’s environment.176
In 2000, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a decision by the
state Commission on Water Resource Management to amend instream flow
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standards.177 As part of its proceedings, the Commission relied in part on its
responsibility under the public trust doctrine and applied the doctrine to both surface
and groundwater resources. In reviewing the Commission’s various standards, the
court provided a detailed history of the public trust doctrine and its application in the
state. The court then turned to the state water code and rejected arguments that the
code displaced or abrogated public trust principles. Rather, instead of abolishing the
common law public trust doctrine, “the legislature appears to have engrafted the
doctrine wholesale into the Code.”178 Finally, the court turned to its own constitution
and held that the people of the state had “elevated the public trust doctrine to the
level of a constitutional mandate.” Thus, the court found that the doctrine was a
“fundamental principle” of constitutional law in the state. Moreover, the court held
that mere compliance by agencies under the water code is not sufficient to determine
whether their actions comport with the public trust doctrine. Instead, the doctrine
“continues to inform the Code’s interpretation, define its permissible ‘outer limits’
and justify its existence.”179
With regard to the scope and purpose of the trust (embodied in common law,
statutory and constitutional form), the court relied on holdings in California and
other states that the purposes and uses of the trust “have evolved with changing
public values and needs.”180 Thus, the state has both an authority and duty to
preserve the rights of present and future generations in the waters of the state, and
must take its duty into account when allocating water resources.181 The court held
that these trust principles applied equally to both surface water and groundwater,
stating that “[m]odern science and technology have discredited the surface-ground
dichotomy.”182 The court went on to reason that in determining the scope of public
trust resources, “we see little sense in adhering to artificial distinctions neither
recognized by the ancient system nor borne out in the present practical realities of
the state.”183
Another example of a court relying on all forms of public trust principles to
support government action is the North Carolina Court of Appeals’ 2005 decision in
Parker v. New Hanover County.184 In that case, a landowner challenged a special
assessment for an inlet relocation project to address coastal erosion and damage. In
holding the assessment was not unconstitutional, the court relied on the state’s
common law, statutory and constitutional authority to protect natural resources. The
court stated first that the public trust doctrine applied to the waters and lands at
issue.185 It then shifted focus to the state’s constitutional provision setting forth a
policy that the state:
conserve and protect all its lands and waters for the benefit of all its citizenry
. . . and preserve park, recreational, and scenic areas, to control and limit the
pollution of our air and water, to control excessive noise, and in every other
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appropriate way to preserve as a part of the common heritage of this State its
forest, wetlands, estuaries, beaches, historical sites, openlands, and places of
beauty.186
The court found these policies consistent with those in the state’s Coastal
Management Act, emphasizing the value of North Carolina’s coastal resources,
including its estuaries which are “among the most biologically productive regions of
this State and of this Nation. . . .”187 Thus, the court found that the county had
authority to levy the assessments for erosion and other preservation purposes.188 The
court concluded this discussion by stating that its constitution, the public trust
doctrine and state statutes all support taking “proactive steps” to protect property
from hurricanes and other storms, and that the importance of these activities had
been “brought home particularly keenly by recent hurricanes and their devastating
impact along the Gulf Coast of the United States.”189
Likewise, the Washington Supreme Court in 1998 upheld a county ordinance
banning personal watercraft use on all marine waters and one lake in the county
based on both the public trust doctrine as well as “the goals of statewide
environmental protection statutes.”190 Thus, although the plaintiffs argued that the
ban interfered with the public’s ability to use the waters and thus violated the public
trust doctrine, the court held that “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine
to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of
this state.”191 As a result, the court was able to rely on statewide environmental
statutory policy to use the public trust doctrine to protect natural resources, even if it
conflicted with public access rights that were historically protected under the
doctrine.
Similarly the Virginia Court of Appeals held in 2006 that the state’s marine
resources commission was justified in denying a permit to construct a storage shed
on a pier located along a creek based on public trust principles.192 In reaching its
decision, the court cited the applicable state law, which directed the agency to
consider preservation of public trust resources in reviewing applications for permits
to build structures over state owned lands.193 The court cited not only the common
law doctrine as support for the agency’s action, but also the Virginia Constitution
setting forth a policy to protect the state’s “atmosphere, lands, and waters from
pollution, impairment or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment and welfare of the
people of the Commonwealth.”194
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2. Public trust principles as a defense against takings claims

Courts in many jurisdictions have relied upon public trust principles to support
state environmental regulations in the face of constitutional takings claims. As
students and scholars of property and land use well know, regulatory takings is a
“hot” issue these days, with several Supreme Court decisions in a short period of
time and significant commentary.195 However, the use of public trust principles as a
counterbalance to takings claims for public interest purposes has a strong history
going all the way back to Illinois Central196 and continuing up to the present. As a
result there is strong precedent for courts to use public trust principles to promote
protection of natural resources without running afoul of takings claims that would
cripple environmental protection efforts.
For instance, in Illinois Central, the issue over whether Illinois had the power to
convey the land under Lake Michigan to the railroad is really a question of whether,
once the state conveyed the land, it had to proceed by eminent domain to get it back,
or whether it could simply invalidate the original conveyance. That is precisely how
Justice Shiras in his dissenting opinion saw the issue. In his opinion, Justice Shiras
reviewed the contract conveying the land to the railroad and found that the contract
conveyed the ownership of land but prevented the railroad from impairing public
rights of navigation or obstructing the harbor in any way.197 As a result, Justice
Shiras posited that there was no impairment of any public trust rights until and unless
the railroad attempted to infringe upon those limitations contained in the initial
grant.198 In the meantime, if Illinois wanted to take back the lands it had granted, it
could do so only “by a constitutional condemnation of them.”199
The majority, of course, rejected this analysis, holding instead that the public
trust prevented the conveyance of land in the first place. On the takings issue, the
Court found that the arguments on that issues were “not parallel” to the current
case.200 Instead, the Court stated simply that common law and public policy applied
a different source of law when the issue was lands under navigable waters
historically held in trust for the public.201 Thus, Illinois Central itself embraced the
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concept that public trust principles were historic common law limitations on the
ability of private parties to develop public trust lands.
This idea of the public trust as a background limitation on private property rights
continues through the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decisions in Just v. Marinette
County202 in 1972 and California Supreme Court decisions from the early 1900s into
the 1980s. In Just, the landowners argued that government regulations restricting
them from filling the wetlands on their property required payment of just
compensation.203 In rejecting that argument, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
public trust principles not only required the state to promote navigation but also
protect and preserve waters for fishing, recreation and scenic beauty.204 As a result,
based on public trust principles, a landowner has “no absolute and unlimited right” to
change the “essential character of his land” or use if for a purpose “unsuited to its
natural state and which injures the rights of others.”205
Likewise, the California Supreme Court several times expressly rejected claims
that exercise of the public trust to prevent development of private property
constituted a taking of property which required just compensation. These cases
arose in situations where the state sought to improve navigation and take other
actions to promote the public trust in private tidelands,206 where the state sought to
limit the development of tidelands that had been sold to private parties many years
prior,207 and where nonprofit groups challenged the continuation of prior
appropriated water diversions from inland streams that would impact natural
resources in navigable waters.208 In the last case, the “Mono Lake” decision
discussed supra in Section I.A., the supreme court summarized its precedent in this
area as being based on Illinois Central, which “remains the primary authority even
today, almost nine decades after it was decided.”209 Based on that authority, the
court confirmed that use of public trust principles did not constitute a taking of
property, even where the lands had long been thought free of any interference or
restriction from the public trust.210 Thus, Illinois Central and the various state court
decisions show the public trust as a long-standing common law principle limiting
private development without resulting in a constitutional taking requiring just
compensation.
More recently, historic common law doctrines such as the public trust doctrine
have played a central role in the regulatory takings debate as a result of the Supreme
Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.211 In Lucas, the
issue was whether the state’s beachfront management act restricting development of
coastal areas was a taking of private property. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, announced what appeared to be a new “per se” rule of regulatory takings.
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Under this new rule, if the government denies all economic use of property (i.e., a
complete “wipe-out”), the action is a taking of private property that must be
compensated under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
unless “background principles” of state nuisance and property law would have
precluded the development in question.212 As a result, since 1992, courts and
scholars have grappled with which state laws constitute the sort of “background
principles” sufficient to prevent an unconstitutional taking of private property.213
Not surprisingly, one background principle of property law courts have looked to is
the longstanding public trust doctrine, which predates the existence of the United
States itself and has been used a defense to takings cases as far back at Illinois
Central.214
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 2002 that a city’s
denial of a shoreline development permit application was not a taking based on the
“background principles” of Washington law which restricted the type of
development at issue.215 The court stated that the public trust doctrine had always
existed in Washington, and the doctrine was also reflected in the state’s Shoreline
Management Act.216 The court found that the Shoreline Management Act was made
necessary after a long history of sale of tidelands and shoreland resulted in the
privatization of a vast majority of these lands, and unrestricted construction was not
in the public interest.217 Thus, because development in the tideland areas at issue
would have interfered with public trust uses, the development plans were never a
legally permissible use and the restriction of such development was not a taking.218
Here, instead of relying on the more amorphous common law public trust doctrine,
the court used the common law doctrine as a base but used the more specific policy
directives in the state’s shoreline management act to provide standards to flesh out
public trust principles.
Likewise, the New York Superior Court in 1998 upheld the constitutionality of a
state law restricting development in an area of Long Island in large part because of
the important principles of the public trust doctrine, provisions of the New York
Constitution and “the assumption that the conservation of resources is intrinsically
good and necessary for the continuance of society.”219 Finally, the Rhode Island
Superior Court in 2005, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,220 found that the state’s denial
of a permit to fill eighteen acres of salt marsh was not a taking, after the U.S.
Supreme Court had remanded the case for a takings analysis.221 The court described
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the tidal pond adjoining the salt marsh as a “particularly fragile ecosystem,” and the
salt marsh itself as a “valuable filtering system” for runoff and pollutants, and
integral, and necessary to wildlife habitat.222 In rejecting the takings claim, the lower
court held the plaintiff’s proposal to fill the salt marsh would constitute a nuisance
and was also limited by the state public trust doctrine, which was incorporated into
the state’s constitution.223 Indeed, the court cited prior Rhode Island case law stating
that any system of regulation of tidal land in the state must be viewed in the context
of the public trust doctrine.224
These more recent cases show courts following in the tradition of Illinois
Central and Just with regard to regulatory takings cases, but using a more structured
and mutually-reinforcing approach to public trust principles. In these cases, the
courts are drawing on well-founded background principles of property law in the
form of the public trust doctrine, but giving these principles new life and standards
by integrating the new policies and legal standards to protect natural resources
created since the 1970s. Such an approach is not only consistent with Illinois
Central but is also consistent with Lucas’s requirement that modern day
environmental protection regulations be based on background principles of property
law to avoid takings claims in complete “wipe-out” situations.
III. CREATING A MODERN FRAMEWORK TO PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES
So we see in Section II that there is a trend among at least a small group of
courts in recent years to integrate the common law public trust doctrine, state
constitutional environmental protection provisions, and state statutes to protect
natural resources and the environment as a matter of state law. What does this trend
mean and why is it important? Why are we seeing more of this since the 1990s than
in prior years when environmental statutes and constitutional provisions have been
around since the 1970s? The remainder of this Article attempts to address these
questions.
A. Utilizing Public Trust Principles In Conjunction with Constitutional, Statutory
and Regulatory Policy
First, the new federal and state environmental statutes of the 1970s and 1980s
brought with them the creation of expert agencies and funding for vast numbers of
studies and data collection opportunities in areas of air pollution, water pollution,
toxic substances, remediation and pollution control techniques. Richard Revesz has
documented how this growth in expertise has resulted in a marked increase in the
competence and experience of state and local environmental officials who establish
and implement state statutory and regulatory policy.225
There is no reason these statutory standards and policies cannot be used to
inform development of state public trust principles and the decisions cited in earlier
Sections show courts doing so. This trend goes well beyond public trust
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developments and has permeated related areas such as tort claims seeking relief for
environmental harm. For instance, since the explosion of federal and state
environmental statutes beginning in the 1970s, courts have used a growing number
of statutory and regulatory standards to develop their state common law of tort on
issues of liability, damages, and injunctive relief in cases involving environmental
harm. These judicial techniques find support in the proposed final draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts on the topic of “statutory violations as negligence per
se,” which states that an actor is negligent if he or she violates a statute designed to
protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes and if the victim is
within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect.226 Thus, if a plaintiff
meets these requirements she may recover damages or obtain an injunction for
violation of a federal, state or local statute or ordinance227 under the doctrine of
negligence per se even if the statute itself does not provide a private right of
action.228 These same principles apply to claims for nuisance, often cited as the
foundation for modern environmental law, which also can be based on statutory or
regulatory violations.229
Courts have used statutory standards to develop the common law in areas
beyond establishing liability for negligence and nuisance. Indeed, courts have
regularly used statutory policies and standards in recent years to inform the common
law in environmental cases through expansive interpretations of common law strict
liability for environmental harm230 and the growing concept of “stigma damages” for
contaminated property under common law tort claims.231
Both of these
developments can be tied to the enactment in 1980 of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which
revolutionized how the government and the public deals with contaminated
property.232 The same analysis can be applied to public trust principles, which can
and should develop in response to statutory and constitutional developments that
226
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supply necessary standards and policies to address today’s natural resources
issues.233
Certainly the common law public trust doctrine in many states is narrower in
scope that general doctrines of negligence, nuisance and strict liability. However, it
remains a doctrine that has developed with changing societal needs, and, like other
common law doctrines, can look to policy statements and standards contained in
state constitutions and environmental statutes. What courts using a mutuallyreinforcing approach to public trust principles are doing is really no different from
what courts have been doing for years in the context of negligence per se and
nuisance per se.
As stated earlier, the common law public trust doctrine cannot and should not
substitute for strong federal and state legislation and regulation, which can control
pollution more broadly without many of the scope limitations inherent in the public
trust doctrine. However, by integrating constitutional, statutory and regulatory
standards into the public trust law of any particular state, the doctrine can work side
by side with the statutory and regulatory framework to provide incentives to protect
natural resources and the environment.
This is particularly true in states that historically have not had a strong common
law public trust doctrine or do not have an environmental rights statute. First,
Illinois Central arguably imposes at least minimal public trust obligations on all
states234 and, more recently, the Supreme Court has held that the scope of the
doctrine is a function of state law.235 Thus, courts in jurisdictions that have not as of
yet relied on the public trust doctrine for environmental protection purposes can and
should develop their common law doctrine to protect resources based on standards
and policy statements in the numerous federal and state environmental statutes and
regulations placing a premium on environmental protection. Whether or not those
statutes have private rights of action is irrelevant; following the development of the
doctrines of negligence per se and nuisance per se, the public trust doctrine can be a
vehicle for enforcing these statutory and regulatory standards. Indeed, there is a rich
history of legal theory and Supreme Court precedent supporting the idea that statutes
should inform the common law, just as common law has always informed statutes.236
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B. A Contemporary Response to the Critics
Viewing public trust principles in this more holistic and mutually-reinforcing
manner addresses many of the criticisms lodged against the doctrine. First, scholars
have criticized the doctrine for relying on a property-based paradigm of natural
resources protection that has foreclosed a more ecological or holistic vision of our
relationship with the environment.237 These critics argue that the nation was poised
to rethink the importance of private property rights in a radical and progressive way,
rendering the public trust doctrine an anachronism.238
However, as is shown in the judicial decisions described in the prior sections of
this article, when courts rely on broad state constitutional environmental provisions
or policy statements in environmental protection statutes in discussing public trust
principles, the rhetoric conveys a strong sense of the need for an ecology-based
approach to resource protection, and often recognizes the close relationship between
humans and their environment.239 Moreover, while a revolution in favor of
ecological protection over property rights may have seemed to be a potential trend in
the 1980s or early 1990s when these arguments were made, the trend appears to be
much the opposite now. One manifestation of this reversal can be seen in the
Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas,240 which Sax saw as a rejection of an
“ecological worldview” challenge to private property rights.241 Indeed, in recent
years, we seem to be in the midst of a property rights revolution as bipartisan in
some areas of the country as the earlier bipartisan push for environmental regulation
in the 1970s.242
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One very recent example of this trend is the overwhelming legislative response
to the Supreme Court’s 2005 approval of economic development takings in Kelo v.
City of New London.243 Although the decision can be seen as merely reaffirming the
Court’s earlier expansive interpretation of the “public use” clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as of April 2006, forty-five states had proposed
legislation, constitutional amendments, or ballot initiatives aimed at restricting the
use of eminent domain for the purpose of economic development.244 Legislation in
many of these states has passed, radically changing the ability of governments to
take private property for public use projects if they involve private actors.245
Likewise, state ballot initiatives like Measure 37 in Oregon requiring state and
local governments to compensate landowners for most environmental or land use
regulations that diminish the value of their properties show a general distrust of
government regulation in the public interest and more protection of private property
rights.246 The Oregon Supreme Court recently held that Measure 37 was
constitutional,247 and similar ballot initiatives may be presented to voters in 2006 in
Arizona, California, Colorado, Montana, South Carolina, Washington and other
states.248 These trends do not mean that environmentalists should despair of ever
reaching a point in this country where there would be a real revolution in
conceptions of humanity’s relationship with the environment. That day may still
come. But it may not come soon, and in the interim, public trust principles allow the
courts to participate appropriately in the law of natural resources protection
particularly during times where legislative efforts are not a driving force in this area.
Another criticism of the common law public trust doctrine, expressed most
forcefully by Richard Lazarus, is that it draws attention away from the enactment of
strong environmental legislation, which is a more comprehensive and democratic
243
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method of protecting natural resources.249 However, the thesis set forth in this article
is that common law public trust principles and strong environmental legislation are
not an “either-or” proposition. With the approach set out here, strong environmental
legislation is crucial to providing policy direction and standards to the development
of new public trust principles. In this way, the public trust doctrine can provide the
vehicle for state judicial review in cases where the statute does not provide its own
right of action.250
Moreover, it does not appear that the public trust doctrine had any detrimental
impact on the development of federal and state statutory environmental and
regulatory law in earlier years. Congress and the states created the massive statutory
and regulatory framework that currently exists for environmental protection at
precisely the same time that the modern public trust doctrine was also on the rise.251
Indeed, if anything, Sax’s revitalization of the common law public trust doctrine had
an extremely positive impact on the shaping of federal environmental law through
the emphasis on citizen suit provisions and the focus on protection of endangered
species and other environmental resources for the benefit of the public and future
generations.252
Despite these early potential synergies, state common law has been little more
than a sideline for scholars and students of environmental law since the creation of
the federal environmental regulatory system.253 However, today we find ourselves in
an era where there is significant public concern over the failure of the federal
executive and legislative branches to take strong action on today’s environmental
challenges, whether they are automobile emissions, global warming, water pollution,
or regulation of toxic substances.254 Much of this concern is expressed by state and
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local governments who have taken matters into their own hands to attempt to fill
what they see as a “void” left by inadequate federal regulations and inadequate
enforcement of existing regulations.255 State efforts to rely on state common law to
fill this void are most obvious in the area of global warming, where some states are
looking to common law nuisance claims to address greenhouse gas emissions in the
face of the federal government’s refusal to regulate strongly in this area. For
instance, in 2006, North Carolina filed a lawsuit against the Tennessee Valley
Authority claiming greenhouse gas emissions from plants owned by the federal
power authority in several states were harming North Carolina citizens and the
state’s economy.256 The suit is being brought under the source states’ public
nuisance laws as there is no federal statute available to address greenhouse gas
emissions. This perceived federal inaction and recent state responses present the
perfect opportunity to seriously consider the renewed role state public trust
principles can play in new environmental protection efforts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s “new federalism” revolution in the 1990s may
call into question the ability of federal environmental statutes to continue to be the
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driving force to protect the environment.257 The Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Lopez258 and United States v. Morrison259 put limits on the prior
limitless reach of Congress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
Because nearly all federal environmental statutes are enacted pursuant to commerce
clause authority, blind reliance on the ability of Congress to regulate nationwide to
protect natural resources and the environment may not be wise.260 As a result, public
trust principles as implemented by state courts can be developed to be part of the
new and innovative efforts states are undertaking in our federalist system both as a
matter of legislation and of common law.261
Finally, the public trust doctrine has been subject to criticism by those who see it
as simply another unconstitutional deprivation of private property without just
compensation.262 In other words, if the judiciary chooses to apply public trust
principles in an expansive way, it is a taking of private property and just
compensation is due. This argument is based upon the idea that there should be no
difference between state and local regulations that deprive a landowner of her land’s
economic use and judicial application of the public trust doctrine that deprives a
landowner of her land’s economic use.263
However, the idea of the public trust doctrine as a limit on private property rights
is as old as the founding of the nation. This is not some “new” land grab for
environmental protection, but finds its authority starting with Illinois Central which
certainly predated the current debates on regulatory takings.264 Moreover, the idea
that there is something fundamentally different between statutes and regulations
restricting land use on the one hand, and common law on the other has been
257
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cemented into federal constitutional law for over ten years. In Lucas,265 Justice
Scalia stated that the only defense to a denial of all beneficial or economic use of
land was if the regulation was merely forbidding uses that would be prohibited by
“background principles of the state’s law of nuisance and property.”266 As has
always been the case, state common law principles of nuisance and property by
definition expand, and the Court’s decision does not expressly state that state
common law doctrines were set in stone at any particular date. Indeed, Justice Scalia
noted in determining whether common law principles would prevent the use at issue,
“changed circumstances or new knowledge may make what was previously
permissible no longer so[.]”267 As Michael Blumm has shown in his recent article on
the topic, courts in various jurisdictions have applied modern conceptions of
nuisance, public trust, the natural use doctrine, customary rights, water rights, and
wildlife trusts to avoid finding a taking consistent with Lucas.268 That these
background principles are now applied in modern ways to modern issues is simply a
function of the development of state common law and does not run afoul of Lucas or
constitutional takings jurisprudence.269
In the end, state public trust principles will not and should not be a substitute for
strong legislative protection for natural resources and the environment. Our current
regulatory state surely provides far more protection for natural resources and the
environment than the system in place prior to the 1970s. However, there are many
gaps in the system resulting from lack of enforcement, lack of political will, lack of
resources and a host of other impediments to the enactment and enforcement of
strong environmental protection laws. Public trust principles as implemented by
state courts can play a significant role in filling those gaps, if scholars expand their
view of these principles and more lawyers and judges follow the lead of the
decisions discussed in Section II. In this way, those in the legal academy and the
legal profession can begin the process of creating a more comprehensive approach to
natural resources protection that relies upon the public trust doctrine along with
statutory and constitutional policies and standards. Such an approach goes beyond
the formalistic distinctions in the law to see that all these sources of law form a
cohesive whole and, in the process, move the legal doctrine to the next level in
addressing contemporary environmental and natural resource issues.
CONCLUSION
This article proposes a new framework for using public trust principles to protect
natural resources and the environment that creates a mutually-reinforcing
relationship between the common law doctrine and environmental protection
provisions contained in state statutes and constitutions. Such a framework builds on
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recent developments in the state courts that can begin to establish a cohesive
jurisprudence of natural resources protection in contrast to prior scholarship that has
assumed an “either-or” dichotomy between the common law and statutes. Scholars,
courts and lawyers can work toward this goal by reaching out beyond the common
law precedent of the doctrine and incorporating policy statements and standards from
the current codifications of these principles found in state constitutions and statutes.
Doing so will strengthen state public trust principles and provide protection for state
natural resources in situations where other branches of the government cannot or will
not act. Moreover, this process also has the potential to create a new dialogue in the
area of environmental law focusing on principles of ecology and interconnectedness
in a way that has been difficult to achieve so far.

